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Abstract
The world bond market is nearly twice as large as the equity market. The goal of this
dissertation is to study the dynamics of bond price. Among the liquidity risk, interest rate
risk and default risk, this dissertation will focus on the liquidity risk and trading strategy.
Under the mathematical frame of stochastic control, we model price setting in U.S. bond
markets where dealers have multiple instruments to smooth inventory imbalances. The
difficulty in obtaining the optimal trading strategy is that the optimal strategy and value
function depend on each other, and the corresponding HJB equation is nonlinear. To solve
this problem, we derived an approximate optimal explicit trading strategy. The result shows
that this trading strategy is better than the benchmark central symmetric trading strategy.
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Bonds are an important source of financing for governments and corporations. As of 2009,
the size of the outstanding U.S. bond market debt was $31.2 trillion, according to Bank for
International Settlements. Nearly all of the $822 billion average daily trading volume in the
U.S. bond market takes place between broker-dealers and large institutions in a decentralized,
over-the-counter (OTC) market.
In the OTC market, typically, dealers act as counterparties: they buy from public sellers
and sell to public buyers. Dealers quote a pair of bid and ask prices to customers and have the
obligation to buy or sell, respectively, at the quoted prices if their clients wish to exchange at
the quoted price. Dealers provide market liquidity and make their profit from the difference
between their bid and ask (buying and selling) prices and a service charge. Their objective
is to profit from the spread between bid and ask prices, not from price movements. In that
regard, they are different from ordinary investors, who seek to profit by betting on how the
price moves.
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By virtue of their central position and role as price setters, dealers are a logical starting
point for an exploriation of how prices are actually determined inside the “black box.”
Dealers’ trading strategies contribute to price formation. Dealers face an inventory risk when
receiving consecutive trades in the same direction. For example, when a dealer’s inventory
position is large and positive, it is potentially very risky because if the bond depreciates
due to the interest rate change or default, the dealer will lose a considerable amount. For
a risk-averse dealer, this is certainly undesirable. Thus, they can adjust bid and ask prices
to induce more buy orders rather than sell orders and bring their inventory position back
to zero. However, if dealers lower the ask price below the previous bid price at which they
bought the bond, they may lose money. To avoid such situations, dealers may consider
selling a certain amount bond to other dealers or dealer brokes.
The goal of this dissertation is to model bond price determination in the over-the-counter
market. Essentially, the dealers are profit-maximizers, who control their buying and selling.
We modeled the activities of dealers under the framework of stochastical control. Based on
this model, we will answer the following questions:
1. What is the optimal price quoting strategy for a dealer that maximizes profit? Does
it exist? If it exists, is it explicit?




One set of papers, including [Garman 1976], [Amihud and Mendelson 1980], [Madhaven and
Smidt 1993 ], [Avellaneda 2008], models the pricing and inventory behavior of risk-averse
dealers, usually assuming either monopolistic dealers or ignoring the interactions among
dealers’ quotes.
Garman (1976) first presented a rigorous stochastic model of the dealers’ market, explor-
ing the nature of possible failure that the dealer’s inventory of stock or cash becomes zero.
Based on Garman’s framework, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) proved that the bid and ask
prices are monotone decreasing functions of the inventory level and that the spread (the
difference between the ask and bid price) is increasing in distance from the preferred posi-
tion. Due to the complexity of the model, neither Garman nor Amihud were able to give the
closed form solutions to their models. Later, Madhaven and Smidt(1993) derived the quoted
price as a function of inventory deviation from preferred level in a similar framework. Recent
work by Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008) has also focused on the optimal trading strategy.
However, the above-mentioned models of price formation assumed that bid and ask prices
are the only instruments by which a dealer can adjust inventory levels. Indeed, in dealers’
market, dealers may pass around their imbalance of inventory. Without concerning the inter-
dealer trading, the model may fail to be realistic. Since the liquidity in bond markets is very
limited, the optimal strategy would be not to buy and to sell at a unreasonablely low price.
3
Ho and Stoll (1983) used a framework that permits inter-dealer trading, although it does
not arise in the model solution. Lyons (1997) developed a simultaneous trade model of the
spot foreign exchange market, called the “hot potato” model, in which dealers trade with
dealers, passing around inventory imbalances, which is the basis of this dissertation.
The second set of papers, including Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993), and Hansch and Neu-
berger (1996), studied the empirical trading behavior of dealers. Hasbrouck did empirical
analysis of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) specialists. His study examined a compre-
hensive sample of quote, trade, and inventory data. He studied 138 stocks from November
1988 through August 1990. The avarage daily closing inventory was 118.97 (hundred shares)
with a standard deviation of 605.44 (hundred shares). The overall average holding period
was only 0.84 days. His evidence suggested that dealers do have impact on the market. In
his study, he also found out that dealers have different levels of risk aversion, which leads to
different trading behaviors. Even though Hasbrouck studies NYSE specialists, not dealers in
bond market, one thing is in common: both study traders’ behavior under the same objec-
tive. Hansch and Neuberger (1998) used a rich database from the London Stock Exchange,
which allows them to observe market maker inventories directly, something previous studies
have not been able to do. Their results showed that dealers will not protect themselves from
informed customers with wide spreads, but will instead seek to attract them with narrow
spreads.
4
This dissertation attempts to extend existing models of dealers’ price setting behavior to





This chapter collects all the concepts, theorems and examples that are needed in later chap-
ters. For the reader’s convenience, proofs are given for some theorems.
2.1 Stochastic Process
Definition 1 (Oksendal 1998) Given (Ω,F ,P),(1) a stochastic process Xt is a collection
{Xt : t ∈ I} of random variables where the index t belongs to some index set I. We call
that {Xt} is a continuous-time stochastic process if I is an interval in R, or discrete- time
stochastic process if I is a subset of {0, 1, 2, · · · , n, · · · }. We also call t→ Xt(ω) the sample
path of the stochastic process Xt.
(2) a stochastic process {Xt, t ≥ 0} is called an independent increment process if for
any n and any 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < · · · < tn, the increments X0, Xt1 − Xt0 , · · · , Xtn − Xtn−1 are
independent.
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(3) Let an Rn-valued stochastic process X(·) be defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , F = (Ft, t ≥ 0),P). If for any t ≥ 0 and s > t
P(X(s) ∈ B|Ft) = P(X(s) ∈ B|X(t)), ∀B ∈ B(Rn)
process X(·) is called a Markov process, where B(Rn) is the Borel σ-fields of Rn.
Theorem 2 An independent increment process is a Markov process.
Definition 3 A stochastic process {Bt, t ≥ 0} defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is
called a Brownian motion if :
1. B0 = 0
2. Bt is an independent increment process
3. for 0 ≤ s < t, the increment Bt −Bs has a normal distribution N(0, t− s)
Brownian motion is an independent increment process, therefore it is a Markov process.
Definition 4 A stochastic process {Nt, t ≥ 0} defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is
called a Poisson process of rate λ if it verifies the following properties:
1. N0 = 0
2. Nt is an independent increment process
7
3. for 0 ≤ s < t, the increment Nt−Ns has a Poisson distribution with rate λ(t− s), that
is,
P (Nt −Ns = k) = e−λ(t−s)
(λ(t−s))k
k! , k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,.
Poisson process is an independent increment prosess, therefore it is a Markov process.
Theorem 5 Let Lt and Mt be two independent Poisson processes with respective rates λ
and µ. Then the process Nt = Lt +Mt, called the superposition of the processes Lt and Mt,
is a Poisson process of rate λ+ µ.
Theorem 6 Let Nt be a Poisson process with rate λ. Let Yn be a sequence of independent
Bernoulli random variables with parameter p ∈ (0, 1), independent of Nt. Set
Mt = Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ YNt
and
Lt = Nt −Mt.
Then the processes Lt and Mt are independent Poisson processes with respective rates λp and
λ(1− p).
Definition 7 A stochastic process {Ct, t ≥ 0} defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is






where Xn, n = 0, 1, · · · are indepent identically distributed and Nt is a Poisson process.
Theorem 8 Wald Equation Let Xn;n ∈ N be an infinite sequence of real-valued, finite-
mean random variables and let N be a nonnegative integer-valued random variable. Assume
that
(i) N has finite expectation,
(ii) Xn;n ∈ N all have the same expectation,








Then the random sum S :=
∑N
n=1Xn is integrable and
E[S] = E[N ] E[X1],
which is called the Wald equation
Condition (iii) in the above theorem means that for all n, N is not necessary to be
independent of Xn for the Wald equation holds, but {N ≥ n} is independent of Xn.
For a compound Poisson process, due to the independence of Nt and Xn, {Nt ≥ n} is
independent of Xn for all n ≥ 0. Thus, the Wald equation holds.
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2.2 Generator of a Process
Let an Rn-valued Markov process X(·) be defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , F =
(Ft, t ≥ 0),P). The transition distribution of X(·) is defined as follows:
P̂ (t, x, s, B) = P(X(s) ∈ B|X(t) = x), 0 ≤ t ≤ s, B ∈ B(Rn), x ∈ Rn
Further, for any φ(·) ∈ C(Rn; R) ≡ {φ : Rn → R| φ(·) is continuous}, we define
E(φ(X(s; t, x)) =
∫
Rn
φ(y)P̂ (t, x, s, dy), 0 ≤ t ≤ s,
as long as the right-hand side exists.
Definition 9 Suppose X(·) is an Rn-valued process. Let
D(A) =
{
φ ∈ C([0, T ]×Rn)| lim
h→0+






(Aφ)(t, x) = lim
h→0+
Eφ(t+ h,X(t+ h; t, x))− φ(t, x)
h
, ∀φ ∈ D(A),
We call A the Backward Evolution Operator of X(·).
Theorem 10 (Dynkin’s formula [Fleming 2006]) For t < s,
Eφ(s,X(s; t, x))− φ(t, x) = E
∫ s
t
Aφ(r,X(r; t, x))dr, ∀φ ∈ D(A), 0 ≤ t ≤ s
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Definition 11 Suppose X(·) is an Rn-valued stochastic process. Let
D(L) =
{
f ∈ C(Rn)| lim
h→0+








E[f(X(t+ h; t, x))− f(x)]
h
, ∀f ∈ D(L).
We call L the generator of X(·).
Example 12 (Fleming 2006) The generator of a Poisson process, with rate λ > 0 is
(L)f(x) = λ[f(x+ 1)− f(x)]





where Ns is a Poisson process with rate λ(s, x) at time s, is
Lf(x) = λ(t, x)
∫
Rn
(f(x+ y)− f(x))Π(t, x, dy), ∀f ∈ D(L)
where Π(t, x, dy) is the density function of jump size conditional on X(t) = x
It is known that [Fleming 2006] the relation between backward evolution operator A and
generator L is given by
Aφ = φt + Lφ(t, ·), ∀f ∈ D(A)
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2.3 Ito’s Lemma and Feynman-Kac Formula
In its simplest form, Ito’s lemma states the following: let Xt be a solution of the following
stochastic differential equation
dXt = µt dt+ σt dBt. (2.1)
such an Xt is called an Ito drift-diffusion process. Let f(t, x) be a twice differentiable function


















where the last term is the differential form of Ito integral. This immediately implies that
f(t,X) itself is an Ito drift-diffusion process.
The Feynman-Kac formula establishes a link between parabolic partial differential equa-
tions (PDEs) and the expected values. It offers a method of solving certain PDEs by simu-
lating random paths of a stochastic process. Conversely, an important class of expectations
of random processes can be computed by deterministic methods.
Suppose Xt solves the scalar stochastic differential equation
dXt = b(Xt, t)dt+ σ(Xt, t)dBt
and let
u(x, t) = E[f(XT )|Xt = x]
12











u(x, T ) = f(x)
(2.3)
The following example will be used in later chapter.
Example 14 Assume that dSt = σStdBt where σ is a constant, then
v(s, t) = E(x+ qST − γ(qST )2|St = s)




σ2s2uss = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], s ∈ R+
u(q, s, T ) = x+ qs− γq2s2
(2.4)
2.4 Dynamic Programming
We now consider problems in which the Markov process X(·) is actively infulenced by a
control u(·) ∈ U [t, T ] where
U [t, T ] = {u : [t, T ]× Rn → U}
More precisely, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], X(·) = X(·; t, x, u(·)) is defined on
[t, T ]. For convenience, let us call X(·; t, x, u(·)) a controlled Markov process.
Define the performance function:
J(t, x, u(·)) = E{W (X(T ; t, x, u(·)))|Xt = x} (2.5)
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Then define the value function:
V (t, x) = sup
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, x, u(·))
V (T, x) = W (x)
(2.6)
Theorem 15 Bellman’s Priciple of Optimality. Let X(s; t, x, u(·)) be a controlled Markov
process. If W : Rn → R is continuous, then
V (t, x) = sup
u(·)∈U [t,s]
E{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))}, 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T (2.7)
Proof: For all u(·) ∈ U [t, T ] and 0 ≤ t < s ≤ T , by the property of conditional expectation,
J(t, x, u(·)) = Et{W (X(T ; t, x, u(·)))}
= Et{E(W (X(T ; t, x, u(·)))|Fs)}
= Et{E(W (X(T ; t, x, u(·)))|X(s; t, x, u(·)))}
= Et{E(W (X(T ; s,X(s; t, x, u(·)), u(·))))}
= Et{J(s,X(s; t, x, u(·)), u(·))}
(2.8)
The third equation holds because X(·) has the Markov property. Since
J(s,X(s; t, x, u(·)), u(·)) ≤ V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·))),
we have
J(t, x, u(·)) ≤ Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))} ≤ sup
u(·)∈U [t,s]
Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))}
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and this implies
V (t, x) ≤ sup
u(·)∈U [t,s]
Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·))} (2.9)
Next, for any ε > 0 and any u(·) ∈ U [t, s], there exists a uε(·) ∈ U [s, T ], depending on ε
and u(·), such that
V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))− ε ≤ J(s,X(s; t, x, u(·)), uε(·))
For any u(·) ∈ U [t, T ], we now construct a control
ũ(s) =

u(s) if r ∈ [t, s),
uε(r) if r ∈ [s, T ]
Then ũ(·) ∈ U [t, T ], which is still depending on ε and u(·) ∈ U [t, s), and
V (t, x) ≥ J(t, x, ũ(·))
= Et{J(s,X(s; t, x, u(·)), uε(·))}
≥ Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))− ε)}, ∀u(·) ∈ U [t, s]
(2.10)
Consequently,
V (t, x) ≥ sup
u(·)∈U [t,s]
Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))} − ε (2.11)
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we must have
V (t, x) ≥ sup
u(r),t≤r≤s
Et{V (s,X(s; t, x, u))} (2.12)
From (2.9) and (2.12), we get V (t, x) = supu(·)∈U [t,s] E{V (s,X(s; t, x, u(·)))}
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2.5 Heat Equation




σ2uxx + f(u), t ∈ [0, T ]
u(0, x) = g(x)
(2.13)
Theorem 16 If f : X → X satisfies the Lipschitz condition,
|f(u)− f(û)| ≤ L|u− û|, ∀u, û ∈ X, for some constant L > 0, (2.14)
then equation (2.13) admits a unique solution which coincides with that of the following
integral equation:




















σ2x2uxx + f(u) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], x > 0
u(T, x) = g(x), x > 0
u(t, 0) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
(2.17)
Theorem 17 The initial value problem (2.17) is equivalent to the following integral equa-
tion:
v(τ, z) = eτ∆g(ez) +
∫ τ
0
e(τ−s)∆f(v(s, z))ds, (τ, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (2.18)
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where
τ = T − t




























vzz(τ, x) = x
2uxx + xux
(2.21)




σ2vzz + f(v), z ∈ R
v(0, z) = g(ez)
(2.22)
By applying the result of theorem (16), we obtained our conclusion.






σ2s2uss = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], s > 0, q > 0
u(T, q, s) = qs− γq2s2
(2.23)
Let




v(τ, q, z) = u(q, ez+
1
2
σ2τ , T − τ).






















σ2vzz, τ ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ R, q ≥ 0
v(τ, q, z) = qez − γq2e2z
(2.26)






















Also, the solution of the following inhomogeneous heat equation gives an insight into





σ2s2uss +M = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], s > 0, q > 0
u(T, q, s) = 0
(2.28)
Let




v(τ, z) = u(q, ez+
1
2
σ2τ , T − τ).




σ2vzz +M, t ∈ [0, T ], z ∈ R
v(0, q, z) = 0
(2.30)
The solution of equation (2.30) is





















In order to build a realistic model, we will take a look at some basic facts in the bond
markets. First we briefly review the bond market in U.S. Then, we explore the real trading
data provided by Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) 1. The data will serve
to help calibrate our model in simulation. Lastly, we provide the evidence that dealers do
adjust their inventory through controlling the bid and ask prices, which is the reason why
we build the model under the frame of stochastical control.
3.1 Bond Market Introduction
3.1.1 U.S. Bond Market
The most striking observation is that the world’s stock and bond markets, in aggregate,
have a market value in U.S dollar terms of more than $125 trillion in 2009, or approximately
two times the value of the world’s economic output, estimated at approximately $61 trillion
in 2008. It is also interesting to note that the world bond market exceeds the world stock
1http://cxa.marketwatch.com/finra/BondCenter/Default.aspx
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market in size by a factor of nearly 2 to 1. U.S. bonds account for $31, 172 billion 2, a
portion of the global bond market at nearly 38%, despite the fact that U.S. economic output
accounts for less than one-fourth of global output. Due to its size, importance and easily
accessible and free trading data, we focus on modeling the U.S. bond market.
Table (3.1) shows that the largest segment of the U.S. bond market is the mortgage-
backed bond market, and the second largest segment is the U.S. Treasury 3.
Table 3.1: U.S. Bond Market Debt Outstanding As of 30 June 2009, in billions of dollars
U.S. Treasury 6,927.8
Agencies of the U.S. 2,972.4





Most bonds are issued by one of four groups: the U.S. government, a U.S. government-
sponsored agency, state and local governments, or corporations.
The bonds issued by the U.S. government are called treasurys and are grouped into three
categories based on their time to maturity: treasury bills, treasury notes and treasury bonds.
2Data is provided by The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
3This Data is provided by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). The total
U.S. debt outstanding as of 31 March 2009 was $31.2 trillion according to BIS, compared to $34.2 trillion
according to SIFMA
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Treasury bills mature from 28 days to one year. Treasury notes mature from 1 to 10 years.
Treasury bonds mature from 10 to 30 years. Treasurys are widely regarded as the safest bond
investments because they are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. The
income earned from treasurys is exempt from state and local taxes.
Agency bonds are issued by U.S. government-sponsored agencies. The offerings of these
agencies are backed by the U.S. government, but not guaranteed by the full faith and credit
government since the agencies are private entities. Such agencies have been set up in order
to allow certain groups of people to access low cost financing, especially students and first-
time home buyers. Some prominent issuers of agency bonds are the Student Loan Marketing
Association (Sallie Mae), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Agency bonds are usually exempt
from state and local taxes, but not federal tax.
The bonds issued by state and local government are called municipal bonds. Municipal
bonds are a step-up on the risk scale from Treasurys, but they make up for it in tax trickery.
Many munis are exampt from city, state and federal taxes (triple tax-free). Because tax-free
income is so enticing to high-income investors, triple tax-free munis generally offer a lower
coupon rate than equivalent taxable bonds.
Corporate bonds, issued by corporations, are generally the riskiest fixed-income securities
of all because companies, even large, stable ones, are much more susceptible than govern-
ments to economic problems, mismanagement and competition. Cities do go bankrupt, but
it’s infrequent. Not so rare is the once-proud company brought low by foreign rivals or
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management missteps. Pan Am, LTV Steel and the Chrysler bankruptcies of 1979 are the
facts.
Corporate bonds come in several maturities: short term, one to five years; intermediate
term, five to 15 years; long term, longer than 15 years.
The credit quality of companies and governments is closely monitored by two major debt-
rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. They assign credit ratings based on the
entity’s perceived ability to pay its debts over time. Those ratings, expressed as letters (Aaa,
Aa, A, etc.), help determine the interest rate that a company or government has to pay.
Corporations, of course, do many things to keep their credit ratings high. The difference
between an A rating and a BBB rating can mean millions of dollars in extra interest paid.
But even companies with less-than-investment-grade (B and below) ratings issue bonds.
These securities, known as high-yield, or junk bonds, are generally too speculative for the
average investor, but they can provide higher return with greater risk.
Zero-coupon bonds are fixed-income securities that do not make periodic interest pay-
ments like regular bonds. Instead, the bond is sold at a deep discount to its face value and at
maturity, the bondholder collects all of the compounded interest, plus the principal. Zeros
are usually priced aggressively and are useful for investors who are looking for a set payout
on a given date, instead of a stream of payments that they have to figure out where to invest
elsewhere.
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Table 3.2: U.S. Bond Types, Tax Exemption and Risk Level
Types Issurer Tax Exemption Risk
Treasureies U.S. Government State and Local Safest
Agency U.S.Government-sponsored Agency State and Local Safer
Municipal State and Local Government Federal, State and Local Safe
Corporate Corporate None Risky
3.1.2 Features of Bonds
The most important features of a bond are:
1. nominal, par or face value: the amount on which the issuer pays interest, and which,
most commonly, has to be repaid at the end of the term. Usually, the face value is
1, 000 per bond.
2. issue price: the price at which investors buy the bonds when they are first issued,
which will typically be approximately equal to the nominal amount.
3. maturity date: the date on which the issuer has to repay the nominal amount. As long
as all payments have been made, the issuer has no more obligation to the bond holders
after the maturity date.
4. coupon rate: the interest rate that the issuer pays to the bond holders. Usually this
rate is fixed throughout the life of the bond. It can also vary with a money market
index.
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5. callability: the right given to the issuer to repay the bond before the maturity date
on the call dates. These bonds are referred to as callable bonds. Most callable bonds
allow the issuer to repay the bond at par. With some bonds, the issuer has to pay
a premium, the so called call premium. This is mainly the case for high-yield bonds.
These have very strict covenants, restricting the issuer in its operations. To be free
from these covenants, the issuer can repay the bonds early, but only at a high cost.
6. putability: the right given to the holder to force the issuer to repay the bond before
the maturity date on the put dates.
3.1.3 Risks and Pricing
A bond is not risk-free. Its inherent risks are liquidity risk, default risk and interest rate
risk.
Liquidity risk describes the danger that when investors need to sell a bond, investors will
not be able to. The simple truth is that when a bond is sold on the secondary market, there
is not always a buyer. The market for bonds is considerably more illiquid than for stocks.
The most activly traded bond has only about 10 trades a day on average. For an illiquid
bond, it only has 1 trade a month.
Default risk is that bond issuer fails to pay the payments to the bond holder. A bond is
nothing more than a promise to repay the debt holder. And promises are made to be broken.
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Treasury bond are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. But
Municipal Bond and corporate bond are possible to default.
Interest rate risk is that the bond price may go down due to the change of interest rate.
If investors want to sell it, they may loose money. Bond prices have an inverse relationship
to interest rates. When one rises, the other falls. However, if investors hold a security until
maturity, interest rate risk is not a factor.
The higher the risk, the higher the return, the principle of pricing. In general, the risk for
Treasury bond is lowest, then the municipal bond, and the highest risk bond is a corporate
bond. In figure (3.1), the x-axis stands for the maturity of bond and the y-axis stands for
the yields. The upper curve is the AAA corporate bond, treasury bond is the lower curve,
and the circle dots are for the municiple bond. The data is collected on Dec.2010 1.
Bond pricing is another branch of the literature different from the focus of this disser-
tation. Bond pricing computes the premium of risk, or the true value. This dissertation
focuses on the trading strategy of dealer, however, dealer’s trading strategy is based on the
true price. The methods of bond pricing are introduced in Appendix B.
3.2 The Data
In this section, we explore the statistic of data, which will be useful for chosing the right
parameters in the simulation of later chapters. The time series data used consists of trade-
1http://finance.yahoo.com/bonds
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Figure 3.1: Yield curve of Treasury, Municipal and Corporate Bonds
by-trade information from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). TRACE is
the FINRA 0 developed vehicle that facilitates the mandatory reporting of over-the-counter
secondary market transactions in eligible fixed income securities. All broker/dealers who
are FINRA member firms have an obligation to report transactions in corporate bonds to
TRACE under an SEC approved set of rules. Current TRACE reporting time is 15 minutes.
0Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
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TRACE started operation in July 2002.
We choose one bond as an example. In Figure (3.2), it is the trading data of bond issued
by Bank of America 1 from Jan. 1 of 2009 to Jan.1 of 2010. Letter “S” stands for the price of
selling to customer, “B” for buying from customers and “D” for inter-dealer trading. We can
see that “B<D<S”, that is, the inter-dealer price is always between the buying and selling
prices.
Figure 3.2: BAC bond trading data: time period 1/1/2009 - 1/1/2010
1CUSIP: 060505BP8. Security Category: Corporate. Offer date:08/23/2004. Maturity Date: 10/01/2010.
Coupon Rate: 4.250%. Coupon Type: Fixed. Pay Frequency: Semi-annually. Offer Price: $99.478 . Offer
Size: $750,000,000.00 . S&P rating:A.
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In Table (3.3), some statistics of the data above are given. There are about 3000 trades
during 1/1/2009 to 1/1/2010. Regardless the order types, the maximal order arrival rate
is 77 on 4/16/2009, the median order size is 25,000 dollars, and the median price is 99.50
dollars.
Table 3.3: BAC Bond Trading Data Statistic, time period 1/1/2009 - 1/1/2010
Date quantity Price
4/16/2009: 77 Min. : 1000 Min. : 79.80
5/12/2009: 68 1st Qu.: 10000 1st Qu.: 97.15
3/17/2009: 52 Median : 25000 Median : 99.50
4/15/2009: 48 Mean : 114931 Mean : 98.85
4/2/2009 : 48 3rd Qu.: 50000 3rd Qu.: 101.89
2/17/2009: 43 Max. : 5000000 Max. : 103.92
There are 518 trades that buy from the customers, summarized in Table (3.4). The
maximal order arrival rates is 16 on 1/20/2009, the median trade quantity of buying from
the customer is 30,000 dollars, and the median price is 99.64 dollars.
There are 1172 trades that sell to the customers and 1366 trades that take place inter-
dealers, shown in Table (3.5) and Table (3.6), respectively.
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Table 3.4: The Statistic of Buying, time period 1/1/2009 - 1/1/201
Date quantity Price
1/20/2009: 16 Min. : 1000 Min. : 79.80
2/20/2009: 9 1st Qu.: 15000 1st Qu.: 96.90
2/19/2009: 7 Median : 30000 Median : 99.64
2/25/2009: 7 Mean : 224921 Mean : 98.31
2/26/2009: 7 3rd Qu.: 100000 3rd Qu.:101.80
2/4/2009 : 7 Max. :5000000 Max. :103.43
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Inventory adjustment
To test if dealers adjust their inventories, we check the total quantity buying from customers,
total quantity selling to customers and total quantity trading between dealers, where quantity
is counted by the traded par value.
To avoid a tedious data display, we only elaborate one statistic in Table 3.7, bond issued
by Bank of America with symbol BAC.
From the Table 3.7, buying from customers is slightly more than selling to customers in
the first 500 trades, however, there is significant jump after that: Selling to customers is
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Table 3.5: The statistic of Selling
Date quantity Price
5/12/2009: 38 Min. : 1000 Min. : 86.45
4/16/2009: 33 1st Qu.: 10000 1st Qu.: 97.59
2/13/2009: 26 Median : 25000 Median : 99.62
3/17/2009: 25 Mean : 121823 Mean : 99.14
4/15/2009: 25 3rd Qu.: 50000 3rd Qu.:101.75
5/5/2009 : 25 Max. :5000000 Max. :103.92
much higher than buying from customers between 500 and 2000 trades, and in the last 1000
trades, buying and selling are about even.
In order to scale the trading volume, we divide the volume by the offersize, obtaining the
percentage in terms of the offersize, which is shown in Table (3.8). The volume selling to the
customers is about twice as much as that buying from the customers between 500 and 2000
trades. In addition, we test the correlation of buying from customers, selling the customers
and inter-dealer trades. Buying from customers is highly correlated with inter-dealer trades.
Thus far, we know that a dealer does control his inventory. How does the dealer control
his inventory? We suspect that the dealer controls his inventory through adjusting the price.
In next section, we will test our hypothesis.
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Table 3.6: The Statistic of Inter-dealer trades
Date quantity Price
4/16/2009: 41 Min. : 1000 Min. : 82.00
5/12/2009: 29 1st Qu.: 10000 1st Qu.: 97.00
3/17/2009: 25 Median : 25000 Median : 99.39
4/2/2009 : 25 Mean : 67308 Mean : 98.80
3/12/2009: 21 3rd Qu.: 50000 3rd Qu.:102.03
3/16/2009: 21 Max. :3030000 Max. :103.53
Table 3.7: Trading Volume Dynamics, in millions of dollars. BAC: period 1/1/2009-1/1/2010
Trades type 1-500 501-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 2001-2500 2501-3000
Buy from customers 19.182 19.237 9.563 10.854 18.007 35.638
Sell to customers 15.535 30.435 15.157 25.599 17.694 35.295
Inter-dealer trades 15.164 14.533 8.889 13.555 11.593 24.928
3.3.2 Price Determination
First, we check the correlation of prices. In Table (3.10), both the prices buying from the
customers and the price selling to the customers are highly correlated with the price of inter-
dealer trading. They three co-move up and down. However, it shows a weak correlation
between price and trading volume in Table (3.11). This seems to be contrary to what we
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Table 3.8: Trading Volume Dynamics, percentage of offersize.BAC: period
1/1/2009-1/1/2010
Trades type 1-500 501-1000 1001-1500 1501-2000 2001-2500 2501-3000
Buy from customers 2.5576 2.5649 1.2751 1.4472 2.4009 4.7517
Sell to customers 2.0713 4.058 2.0209 3.4132 2.3592 4.706
Inter-dealer trades 2.0219 1.9377 1.1852 1.8073 1.5457 3.3237
Table 3.9: Correlation of Monthly Trading Volume
Correlation Buy from customers Sell to customers Inter-dealer
Buy from customers 1 0.6213955 0.9198096
Sell to customers 0.6213955 1 0.6686847
Inter-dealer trades 0.9198096 0.6686847 1
expect. To understand this puzzle, a further exploration is done by checking the correlation
between the price and the accumulated trading volume, shown in Figure (3.3).
From Figure (3.3), we can tell that
1. The accumulated trading volume fluctuates around zero.
2. During the big downturn period, the variance of the accumulated trading volume is
significantly larger than the other periods.
3. During the big downturn period, the buying trades take place at a very low price,
which indicate the desire not to buy.
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Table 3.10: Correlation of Weekly Average Price
Correlation Buy from customers Sell to customers Inter-dealer
Buy from customers 1 0.9534928 0.9602006
Sell to customers 0.9534928 1 0.9944935
Inter-dealer Sell 0.9602006 0.9944935 1
Table 3.11: Correlation of Average Price and Trading Volume
Correlation Buy Volume Sell Volume Inter-dealer volume Imbalance
Price Buy 0.057 -0.283 0.265 0.486
Price Sell 0.105 -0.245 0.285 0.492
Price Inter-dealer 0.077 -0.244 0.274 0.454
The information from the accumulated trading volume tells us that the price weakly
responds to the volume of each single trade, however, the price strongly responds to the
accumulated trading volume associated with the dealer’s inventory.
3.3.3 Summary
The following are our findings.
1. The retail prices (bid and ask) are positively strongly correlated with inter-dealer price.
2. The price weakly corresponds to each single trading volume.
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Figure 3.3: Price and Accumulated Trading Volume
3. The bid and ask prices are not central symmetric to the inter-dealer trading price.
4. The accumulated trading volume fluctuates around zero. The price corresponds to the
significant fluctuation of the accumulated trading volume. This is the evidence that
the dealers control their inventory thought adjusting their quoting prices.
All of these findings will be explained by the results of our model later.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTINUOUS TIME MODEL WITH INTER-DEALER
TRADING
A bond dealer’s objective is to maximize his profit from providing liquidity and avoiding
the inventory risk at the same time. Lyons (1997) introduced a simultaneous trade model
of the spot foreign exchange market in which dealers trade with other dealers. We adopt a
similar idea for bond market trading since inter-dealer trading exists in bond market, as our
empirical analysis shows in Chapter 3. In our model, bid price, ask price and the amount
traded with other dealers are three instruments for the dealer to achieve his objective.
4.1 The Model
In this section, we will describe the model and settings.
The time horizon. We consider a time horizon of one day or a short time period [0, T ],
which is far away from the issuance date and the maturity date of the bond.
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The market dynamics. We assume that the random source governing the true price
S(·) of the bond is exougenous, and S(·) follows the following stochastic differential equation:
dS(τ) = σS(τ)dB(τ), τ ≥ 0
S(t) = s
(4.1)
where B(τ) is a one dimensional standard Brownian motion and σ > 0 is a constant. The
dealer measures the risk of his inventory based on the true price S(·).
The dealer’s state variables and controls. The dynamics of the dealer’s cash and

























vd(τi), τ ∈ [t, T ]
C(t) = x,Q(t) = q
(4.2)
In the above,
• C(τ) is the cash position at time τ .
• Q(τ) is the inventory position at time τ .
• δb(τ) is the spread of the buying price to customers at time τ . In another words,
S(τ)− δb(τ) is the price at which bonds are purchased from customers.
• δs(τ) is the spread of the selling price from customers at time τ . In another word,
S(τ) + δs(τ) is the price at which bonds are sold to customers.
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• δd(τ) is the spread of the inter-dealer price at time τ , which is oberserved from the
market. In another word, S(τ) + δd(τ) is the price traded between dealers.
• V si is the volume of bonds sold to customers at time τi. V si i≥1 is a sequence of i.i.d
random variables.
• V bi is the volume of bonds purchased from customers at time τi. V bi i≥1 is a sequence of
i.i.d random variables.
• vd(τ) is the volume of bonds bought or sold in inter-dealer market at time τ .
• N bτ and N sτ are Poisson processes with intensities λb and λs, which depend on δb and
δs. We assume that N bτ and N
s
τ are independent.
• Ndτ is a Poisson process with intensities λd, which is a constant. Process Ndτ is inde-
pendent of N sτ and N
b
τ .
The wealth process of the dealer is given by
W (τ) = C(τ) + S(τ)Q(τ), τ ∈ [t, T ] (4.3)
The objective. The objective of the dealer is to maximize his expected profit from
transactions given the uncertainty in the security’s value. Therefore, we will use the following
objective function:
J(t, x, q, s;u(·)) = Et(W (T )− γ(Q(T )S(T ))2), (4.4)
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where γ > 0 is a fixed constant, risk aversion coefficient, u(·) = (δb(·), δs(·), vd(·)) is the
control processes. The value function is defined by
v(t, x, q, s) = max
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, x, q, s;u(·)), (4.5)
with U [t, T ] being a set of all admissible controls u(·) = (δb(·), δs(·), vd(·)).
4.2 Frozen Strategy and Reservation Price
A frozen strategy is defined as one in which the dealer holds his inventory until the terminal
time T . In this case, the dealer takes δb(τ) = δb0, δ
s(τ) = δs0, and v
d(τ) = 0 such that
λb(δb(τ), δs(τ)) = λb(δb0, δ
s
0) = 0,




and we denote u0(·) = (δb0, δs0, 0). Under the control u0(·), the dealer’s cash and inventory
position remain as constants on [t, T ], that is, Q(τ) = q, C(τ) = x, τ ∈ [t, T ].
For convenience, we refer to v0(t, x, q, s) as the frozen value function,
v0(t, x, q, s) ≡ J(t, x, q, s;u0(·)) = Et(x+ qST − γ(qST )2), ∀(t, x, q, s) ∈ [0, T ]×R×R×R+.
(4.7)
The following proposition gives a representation of the frozen value function v0(t, x, q, s).
Proposition 20
v0(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t) (4.8)
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σ2(T − t) + σ(B(T )−B(t)) (4.10)
Noticing that S(T )
s
is log normal distributed with mean −1
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v0(t, x, q, s) =Et(W (T )− γ(Q(T )S(T ))2)




Reservation price [Avellaneda 2008] is the price that would make the dealer indifferent
between his current inventory and his current inventory plus or minus 1. The following is
an extension of this notion.
Definition 21 Let v be the objective function of the dealer, the reservation bid price at
(t, q, s, y), denoted by rb(t, q, s, y), is given by the relation
v(t, x− rb(t, q, s, y)y, q + y, s) = v(t, x, q, s)
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The reservation ask price at (t, q, s, y), denoted by rs(t, q, s, y), is given by
v(t, x+ rs(t, q, s, y)y, q − y, s) = v(t, x, q, s)
Note that the case y = 1 is the notion introduced in [Avellaneda 2008]. The following
results give the explicit formulas for rb(t, q, s, y) and rs(t, q, s, y)
Proposition 22 For the value funtion v0(x, q, s, t) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t), the reservation
bid and ask prices at (t, q, s, y) are given by
rb(t, q, s, y) =s− (y + 2q)γs2eσ2(T−t)
rs(t, q, s, y) =s+ (y − 2q)γs2eσ2(T−t)
(4.13)
Proof: By definition (21) and (4.8),
0 =v0(t, x− rb(t, q, s, y)y, s, q + y)− v0(t, x, q, s)
=x− rb(t, q, s, y)y + (q + y)s− γ(q + y)2s2eσ2(T−t) − (x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t))
=− rb(t, q, s, y)y + ys− (2qy + y2)γs2eσ2(T−t)
(4.14)
This leads to the first formula in (4.13) Similarly, we can show the second formula in (4.13).
If the dealer quotes the bid price S(t)−δb(t) < rb(t, q, s, y) and ask price S(t)+δs(t) > rs,
his value function v > v0. This implies the fozen strategy u0(·) = (δb0, δs0, 0) = (s−rb, rs−s, 0).





σ2s2wss = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], s ∈ R+
w(q, s, T ) = x+ qs− γq2s2
(4.15)
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This inspires us to break down the problems in the model in Section 1. We will use this
result to construct the value function of the model in section 6.
4.3 A Symmetric Strategy
In this section, we consider a benchmark strategy that is symmetric around the true price,
regardless of the inventory, and inter-dealer trading is not considered. More precisely, a
trading strategy u(·) = (δb(·), δs(·), vd(·)) is called a symmetric strategy if δb(τ) = δs(τ) =
δ, vd(τ) = 0, τ ∈ [t, T ]. Further, we assume that the arrival rates satisfy the following
λ(δ) = λs(δ) = λb(δ) = Ae−kδ,
where A, k are positive constants.









J(t, x, q, s;uδ(·)) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ
2(T−t) + 2Ae−kδ(T − t)v̄(δ − γεs2eσ2(T−t)) (4.16)
When δ = δ̄ ≡ 1/k + γεs2eσ2(T−t), J(t, x, q, s;uδ(·)) reaches its maximum.
Proof: Under uδ(τ) = (δ, δ, 0), τ ∈ [t, T ], Q(τ) and C(τ) are compound Poisson processes.
By the Wald equation,
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2 + E((N sT−t)
2 −N sT−t)(E(V s1 ))2
− 2λb(δ)(T − t)v̄λs(δ)(T − t)v̄
= q2 + 2λ(T − t)εv̄
(4.18)
Similarly, we have








(Sti − δ)V bi )
= x+ E(N sT−t)(s+ δ)v̄ − E(N bT−t)(s− δ)v̄
= x+ 2λ(T − t)v̄δ
(4.19)
Therefore,
J(t, x, q, s;uδ(·)) = Et(C(T ) + STQT − γ(STQT )2)
= x+ 2λ(T − t)v̄δ + qs− γ(q2 + 2λ(T − t)εv̄)s2eσ2(T−t)
= x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t) + 2λ(T − t)v̄(δ − γεs2eσ2(T−t))
= v0(t, x, q, s) + 2Ae−kδ(T − t)v̄(δ − γεs2eσ2(T−t))
(4.20)
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This gives (4.16). Now, we maximize δ → 2Ae−kδ(T − t)v̄(δ − γεs2eσ2(T−t)) ≡ g(δ). To this
end, we let
0 = g′(δ) = −2kAe−kδ(T − t)v̄(δ − γεs2eσ2(T−t)) + 2Ae−kδ(T − t)v̄ (4.21)
Solving (4.21) for δ, we obtain δ̄ = 1/k + γεs2eσ
2(T−t). It is easy to show that g′′(δ̄) < 0.
sup
δ>0















It is interesting to see that m(t) > 0, t < T , decreasing function in t.
Another meaningful result that one can obtain from Lemma (23) is that δ is an increasing
function in σ. This suggests that the larger the volatility of the true price is, the larger the
dealers’ quoting spread.
4.4 HJB Equation
We have calculated a special case in the previous section in which the optimal quoting prices
can be obtained through calculating the objective function directly. However, it is difficult
to calculate the objective function when δs and δb are not constant over time, so that we can
not obtain the optimal quoting price. Therefore, we need to explore some other ways. In
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this section, we apply Bellman’s principle to obtain the HJB equation satisfied by the value
function. We first derive the HJB equation for the model introduced in section (4.1).
Proposition 24 Let the processes C(τ), Q(τ), S(τ) be determined by (4.1) and (4.2) Sup-
pose f ∈ C2(R4, R), then, for any u = (δb, δs, vd) ∈ U











{f(x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s, t)− f(x, q, s, t)}F (dy)
+λd{f(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− f(t, x, q, s)}
(4.23)
where Au is the backward evolution operator of C(τ), Q(τ), S(τ) (Definition (9)), F b, F s are
the distribution functions of V bi , V
s
i respectively.
Proof: In (t, t+ ∆t), by applying Taylor expansion, we have
f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(t, x, q, s)
=f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(t+ ∆t, x, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s))
+ f(t+ ∆t, x, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)
+ f(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)− f(t, x, q, s)
=ft(t, x, q, s)∆t+ fs(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)(S(t+ ∆t)− s) +
1
2
fss(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)(S(t+ ∆t)− s)2
+ f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(t+ ∆t, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s))
+ o(∆t) + o((S(t+ ∆t)− s)2)
(4.24)
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For the term fs(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)(S(t+ ∆t)− s), we notice that






Et{fs(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)(S(t+ ∆t)− s)} = 0 (4.25)
For the third term,










fss(t+ ∆t, x, q, s)(S(t+ ∆t)− s)2}
= lim
∆t→0







σ2s2fss(x, q, s, t)
(4.26)
For the last term,
f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(t+ ∆t, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s)),
we can not apply Taylor expansion since C(t) and Q(t) are not continuous processes.




t are independent. In a short enough time period
(t, t+∆t), there is only one order, selling, buying, or inter-dealer, coming in with probability
(λs + λb + λd)∆t, and there is two or more orders coming in with probability O((∆t)2).
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Et(f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t))












{f(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− f(t, x, q, s)}F b(dy)




Et(f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t))
− f(t+ ∆t, x, q, S(t+ ∆t))|Nt+∆t = n)
e−(λ










{f(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− f(t, x, q, s)}F b(dy)
+λd{f(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− f(t, x, q, s)}
(4.27)
Combining (4.24),(4.25),(4.26)and (4.27), we obtain our conclusion.







Et{f(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− f(x, q, s, t)}
= sup
u∈U
Auf(x, q, s, t), uniformly in u ≡ (δb, δs, vd) ∈ U
(4.28)
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Proof: By (4.24) and (4.27), in (t, t+ ∆t), we have
1
∆t
Et{f(C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)− f(x, q, s, t)}
=ft(x, q, s, t) +
1
2







Et{f(C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)− f(x, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)
+ o(1)}
=ft(x, q, s, t) +
1
2







Et{f(x+ (s+ δs)y, q − y, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)




Et{f(x− (s− δb)y, q + y, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)
− f(x, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)}F b(dy)
+λdEt{f(x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)− f(x, q, S(t+ ∆t; t, s), t+ ∆t)}}
+ o(1) +O(∆t)
(4.29)
Taking the supremum over u ≡ (δb, δs, vd) ∈ U and sending ∆t → 0, we obtain our
conclusion.




s2σ2vss +H(t, v(t, x, q, s)) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
v(T, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2, (x, q, s) ∈ R2 × R+
v(t, x, q, 0) = x, (t, x, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R2
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where










{v(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)}F (dy)
+λd{v(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− v(t, x, q, s)}}
(4.30)
Proof: By the property of conditional expectation, we have
Et(WT − γ(QTST )2) = Et(Et+∆t(WT − γ(QTST )2)) (4.31)
By the Bellman’s priciple,
v(t, x, q, s) = sup
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
(Et(WT − γ(QTST )2))
= sup
u(·)∈U [t,T ]





Et+∆t(WT − γ(QTST )2))
= sup
u(·)∈U [t,t+∆t]
Et(v(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q), S(t+ ∆t; t, s)))
(4.32)
Fix (t, x, q, s) ∈ [t, T ]× R+ × R× R+, for any u ∈ U, we have
v(t, x, q, s) ≥ Et(v(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x, u), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q, u), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))) (4.33)
Consequently, by substracting v(t, x, q, s) both sides and letting ∆t→ 0, we have
0 ≥ 1
∆t
Et(v(t+ ∆t, C(t+ ∆t; t, x, u), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q, u), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))− v(t, x, q, s))






Auv(x, q, s, t) ≤ 0. (4.35)
On the other hand, for any ζ > 0, and ∆t small enough, there exists a uζ,∆t ∈ U [t, T ] such
that





Et{vt+ ∆t, (C(t+ ∆t; t, x, u), Q(t+ ∆t; t, q, u), S(t+ ∆t; t, s))
− v(t, x, q, s)}
→ sup
u∈U
Auv(x, q, s, t)
(4.36)
In proving the last limit above, we used (4.28). Combining (4.35) and (4.36), since ζ > 0 is
arbitrary, we obtain our conclusion.
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4.5 Existence and Uniqueness of the Solution to the HJB
Equation
For any v(·) ∈ C([0, T ] × R+ × R × R+), define operator T : C([0, T ] × R+ × R × R+) →
C([0, T ]× R+ × R× R+) by










{v(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)}F b(dy)
+λd{v(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− v(t, x, q, s)}}
(4.37)
Theorem 27 Suppose
λs(δb, δs) + λb(δb, δs) + λd ≤M, ∀δb, δs ∈ R+,
then operator T is bounded.
Proof: For any v(·) ∈ C([0, T ]× R+ × R× R+),
‖(Tv)(·)‖∞ ≤ 2(λ
s + λb + λd) ‖v(·)‖∞
≤ 2M ‖v(·)‖∞
(4.38)
Therefore, operator T is bounded.
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s2σ2vss + (Tv)(t, x, q, s) = 0
v(T, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2
v(t, x, q, 0) = x
Making transformation:












σ2wzz + (Tw)(τ, x, q, z)
w(0, x, q, z) = x+ qez − γq2e2z
(4.40)
We study this equation via the corresponding integral equation
w(τ, x, q, z) = eτ∆w(τ, x, q, z) +
∫ τ
0













We collect some well known facts about the semigroup eτ∆[Weissler 1981].
Proposition 28 1. ‖G(τ, ·)‖1 = 1 for all τ > 0.





3. If 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, then
∥∥eτ∆f∥∥
p
= ‖f‖p for all τ > 0
Theorem 29 If λs + λb + λd ≤M , then equation ( 4.40) admits a unique solution.
Proof: For any w(·, ·) ∈ C([0, T ]×R3), define operator F : C([0, T ]×R3)→ C([0, T ]×R3)
by
(Fw)(x, q, z, τ) = eτ∆w(0, x, q, z) +
∫ τ
0
e(τ−r)∆(Tw)(r, x, q, z)dr (4.43)
The equation (4.41) becomes
w(τ, x, q, z) = (Fw)(τ, x, q, z)
We claim that, for δ = 1
4M
, ∀w1, w2 ∈ C([0, δ]× R+ × R× R+)
‖Fw1 − Fw2‖∞ ≤
1
2
‖w1 − w2‖∞ (4.44)
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‖w1 − w2‖∞ dr






Hence, by the contraction mapping principle, equation (4.38) admits a unique solution
in [0, δ]. Repeating this process, we obtain our conclusion.
4.6 Optimal Trading Strategy







σ2s2vss +H(t, v(t, x, q, s)) = 0, (t, x, s, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ × R× R+,
v(T, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2, (x, s, q) ∈ R+ × R× R+,
v(t, x, q, 0) = x, (t, x, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R+ × R,
(4.46)
where
H(t, v(t, x, s, q)) = sup(δb,δs,vd)∈R3+{λ
b(δb, δs)
∫
R[v(t, x− (s− δ
b)y, q + y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)]F (dy)
+ λb(δb, δs)
∫
R[v(t, x+ (s+ δ
s)y, q − y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)]F (dy)
+ λd[v(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− v(t, x, q, s)]}.
(4.47)




σ2s2wss = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
w(T, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2
(4.48)
is given by
w(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t).
Let
θ(t, x, q, s) = v(t, x, q, s)− [x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t)],
then
θ(T, x, q, s) = 0
We will show that θ(t, x, q, s) is actually independent of variable x. First, we find the equation




σ2s2θss = vt +
1
2
σ2s2vss = −H(t, v(t, x, q, s)) (4.49)
55
Note that
v(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)
=θ(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s) + [x− (s− δb)y + (q + y)s− γ(q + y)2s2eσ2(T−t)]
− θ(t, x, q, s)− [x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t)]
=θ(t, x− (s− δb)y, q + y, s)− θ(t, x, q, s) + δby − γy(2q + y)s2eσ2(T−t)
(4.50)
Also,
v(t, x+ (s+ δs)y, q + y, s)− v(t, x, q, s)
=θ(t, x+ (s+ δs)y, q − y, s) + [x+ (s+ δs)y + (q − y)s− γ(q − y)2s2eσ2(T−t)]
− θ(t, x, q, s)− [x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t)]
=θ(t, x+ (s+ δs)y, q + y, s)− θ(t, x, q, s) + δsy + γy(2q − y)s2eσ2(T−t)
(4.51)
and
v(t, x+ (s+ δd)y, q − vd, s)− v(t, x, q, s)
=θ(t, x+ (s+ δd)y, q − vd, s) + [x+ (s+ δd)vd + (q − vd)s− γ(q − vd)2s2eσ2(T−t)]
− θ(t, x, q, s)− [x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t)]
=θ(t, x+ (s+ δd)y, q − vd, s)− θ(t, x, q, s) + (pb − s)vd − γvd(2q − vd)s2eσ2(T−t)
(4.52)
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by − γy(2q + y)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, x+ (s+ δs)y, q − y, s)− θ(t, x, q, s)}F (dy)
+ supvd λ
d(δdvd + γvd(2q − vd)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, x+ (s+ δd)vd, q − vd, s)− θ(t, x, q, s)) = 0,
θ(T, x, q, s) = 0
θ(t, x, q, 0) = v(t, x, q, 0)− x = x− x = 0,
(4.53)
Since the terminal condition and boundary condition do not depend on variable x, it is





σ2s2θss + Ĥ(t, θ(t, q, s)) = 0, (t, q, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R2+
θ(T, q, s) = 0, (q, s) ∈ R× R+
θ(t, q, 0) = 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R
(4.54)
where











{δby − γy(2q + y)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, q + y, s)− θ(t, q, s)}F b(dy)
+ sup
vd
λd(δdvd + γvd(2q − vd)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, q − vd, s)− θ(t, q, s)),
(4.55)
If we can find a solution θ(t, q, s) (independent of x) to (4.54), then
v(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, q, s)
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will be a solution to (4.46).
Now we observe that∫
R



































2(T−t)+θ(t, q−y, s)−θ(t, q, s)}F s(dy). From the first-order optimality
















Intuitively, the optimal strategy are obtained through a two-step procedure. First, we solve
the equation (4.54) in order to obtain D+,D− and θq. Second, we solve the implicit equations
(4.57) and obtain the optimal strategy.
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4.6.1 A Modification of HJB Equation
We see that equation (4.54) is highly nonlinear. Thus, it is difficult to find an explicit solution.
In this section, we introduce a modified HJB equation by linearizing Ĥ(t, θ(t, q, s)).
We assume that the arrival rates
λs(δ) = λb(δ) = Ae−kδ, (4.58)

















σ2s2θss + Ĥ(t, θ(t, q, s)) = 0, (t, q, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R× R+
θ(T, q, s) = 0, (q, s) ∈ R× R+
θ(t, q, 0) = 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, T ]× R,
(4.60)
where










λd(δdvd + γvd(2q − vd)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, q − vd, s)− θ(t, q, s))
(4.61)



















(D+ +D−) + · · · ), (4.62)
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we notice that







[θ(t, q + y, s) + θ(t, q − y, s)− 2θ(t, q, s)]F (dy),
(4.63)
and the highest degree of q in Ĥ(t, θ(t, q, s)) is 2. Therefore, we now try to find θ(t, q, s) of
the following form:
θ(t, q, s) = θ0(t, s) + θ1(t, s)q + θ2(t, s)q2, (4.64)
then





































θ(T, q, s) = 0
(4.67)



















θ0(T, s) = 0
(4.68)





d(δd − θ1) = 0
θ1(T, s) = 0,
(4.69)
whose solution is θ1(t, s) = δd(1− e−λd (T−t)).







2(T−t) − θ2) = 0
θ2(T, s) = 0,
(4.70)
whose solution is
θ2(s, t) = γs2(eσ
2(T−t) − e(σ2−λd)(T−t)).
Now, we are at the position to compute the explicit optimal strategy δs,δb and vd.








− δd(1− e−λd (T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε+ 2q), 0










Proof: We obtain this result through substituting θ1 and θ2 back into (4.66). First, we








{γy(2q − y)s2eσ2(T−t) − θ1(s, t)y − θ2(s, t)y(2q − y)}F (dy)
= (γs2eσ
2(T−t) − θ2(s, t))(2qv −
∫
R














{−γy(2q + y)s2eσ2(T−t) + θ1(s, t)y + θ2(s, t)y(2q + y)}F (dy)
= (θ2(s, t)− γs2eσ2(T−t))(2qv +
∫
R




y2P (dy)) + θ1(s, t)v
(4.73)
then, we substitute D− and D+ back into (4.66), which gives
δs = max{1
k
+ δd(1− e−λd (T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε− 2q), 0}
δb = max{1
k
− δd(1− e−λd (T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε+ 2q), 0}
(4.74)
In the third equation of (4.66), since
θq(t, q − vd, s) = θ1(t, s) + 2θ2(t, s)(q − vd),
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we have
vd = q − θ
1(t, s) + 2θ2(t, s)(q − vd)− δd
2γs2eσ2(T−t)
= q − δ
d(1− e−λd (T−t)) + 2γs2(eσ2(T−t) − e(σ2−λd)(T−t))(q − vd)− δd
2γs2eσ2(T−t)
(4.75)
Solving for vd gives




Recall that the value function is
v(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t) + θ(t, q, s),















θ1(t, s) = δd(1− e−λd (T−t))
and




v(t, x, q, s) = v0(t, x, q, s) + θ(t, q, s)
= x+ θ0(s, t) + (δd(1− e−λd(T−t)) + s)q − γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)q2
(4.77)
We define the preferred inventory level to be the inventory level at which the value
function reaches the maximum. By this definition the preferred inventory q̂ is
q̂ =
δd(1− e−λd(T−t)) + s
2γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)
(4.78)
4.7 A comparison with existing models
We have four quoting strategies at hand: reservation bid/ask price (δsr , δ
b
r) with y = ε,
symmetric strategy (δss = δ
b




o), and with dealer
trading strategy (δsw, δ
b
w).
We summarize all the strategies in the following.
δsr = γ(ε− 2q)s2eσ


























− δd(1− e−λd (T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε+ 2q)
(4.79)





r = 2δ −
2
k
, δso + δ
b




w < 2δ (4.80)
This conclusion tells that the market with inter-dealer trading is more liquid than the
market without inter-dealer trading.
Next, we compare the value functions with these four trading strategies, listed as the
following.
value function of reservation prices:
vr(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t),
value function of symmetric strategy:





value function without inter-dealer trading:
vo(t, x, q, s) = x+ qs− γq2s2eσ2(T−t) + 2Av(T − t)
ke
(1− 2kγεs2eσ2(T−t))
value function with inter-dealer trading:
vw(t, x, q, s) = x+ θ0(s, t) + (δd(1− e−λd(T−t)) + s)q − γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)q2
(4.81)
Conclusion 2 If γεs2eσ
2(T−t) < 1/k and q ≥ 2Av(T−t)
ke2δd(1−e−λd(T−t))
, then
vr < vo < vs < vw (4.82)
Proof: 1. It is obvious that vr < vo if γεs2eσ
2(T−t) < 1/k.






2(T−t) − e−(σ2+λd)(T−t)) > 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , λd ≥ 0,









2(T−t) − kγεs2eσ2(T−t)) + δd(1− e−λd(T−t))q





Remark: The conditions for the conclusion (4.82) are not necessary. The reason to use
these conditions is that it has a nice form.
4.8 The Cost of Liquidity
In practice, a market with very low transaction costs is characterized as liquid and one
with high transaction costs as illiquid [M.J. Flemming 2003]. Measuring these costs is not
simple, however, as they depend on the size of a trade, its timing, the trading venue, and the
counterparties. Furthermore, the information needed to calculate transaction costs is often
not available.
As a consequence, a variety of measures are employed to evaluate a markets liquidity.
The bid-ask spread is a commonly used measure of market liquidity. It directly measures the
cost of executing a small trade, with the cost typically calculated as the difference between
the bid or offer price and the bid-ask midpoint (or one half of the bid-ask spread). A liquidity
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measure used in the Treasury market is the liquidity spread between more and less liquid
securities, often calculated as the difference between the yield of an onthe- run security and
that of an off-the-run security with similar cash flow characteristics.1 Trading volume is an
indirect but widely cited measure of market liquidity. Its popularity may stem from the
fact that more active markets tend to be more liquid, and from theoretical studies that
link increased trading activity with improved liquidity. A closely related measure of market
liquidity is trading frequency. Trading frequency equals the number of trades executed within
a specified interval, without regard to trade size.
[M.J. Flemming 2003] reveals that the simple bid-ask spread is a useful measure for
assessing and tracking liquidity for the U.S. Treasury market. The spread can be calculated
quickly and easily with data that are widely available on a real-time basis. The bid-ask
spread thus increases sharply with the equity market declines in October 1997, with the
financial market turmoil in the fall of 1998, and with the market disruptions around the
Treasurys quarterly refunding announcement in February 2000. By contrast, trading volume
and trading frequency are weak proxies for market liquidity, as both high and low levels of
trading activity are associated with periods of poor liquidity.
The spread can be difficult to interpret, however, for the reason that the spread reflects
both the price of liquidity as well as differences in liquidity between securities. In addition,
1An on-the-run security is the most recently auctioned security of a given (original) maturity and an
off-the-run security is an older security of a given maturity. Off-the-run securities are sometimes further
classified as first off-the-run (the most recently auctioned off-the-run security of a given maturity), second
off-the-run (the second most recently auctioned off-the-run security of a given maturity), and so on
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factors besides liquidity can cause the differences of spread. Our results offer an interpreta-








− δd(1− e−λd (T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε+ 2q)
(4.84)
has three components: 1
k
, ±δd(1−e−λd (T−t)) and γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε±2q). The first component
is related to the sensitivity for the customers to the price changes. The more sensitive to
the price changes the customers, the narrower the spread. The second component is from
the inter-dealer trading, if the cost of inter-dealer trading measured by δd is low, the spread
to the customers is also low. The last component is related to the cost for holding the bond,
by comparing with the reservation strategy.
4.9 Calibration of Model
The optimal quoting bid and ask price can be computed given values for the parameters. In
practice, we need to determine the parameters using observed bond prices. In this section,
we will discuss how to determine the parameters involved in this model.
In terms of the meaning of the parameters, based on the statistic of bond trading data
in chapter 3 , we use the following values for the simulation:
• T : the terminal time. We use 1 day or one week.
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• t: the current time.
• A: the maximum order arrival rates. We let it take 40 if T is one day and 200 if T is
one week.
• k: order sensitivity to the price change. We let k = 1.5.
• λd: the average inter-dealer order rates. We let it take 20 if T is one day and 100 if T
is one week.
• v̄: the average order size. We let it be 250, the median of the quantity. (In table 3.2,






. We use a discrete distribution for F .
• σ: the variance of the log middle price of bid and ask. It is 0.01.
• s: the current middle price. It is 100.
• q: the current inventory. We let it be 0.
• γ: the risk aversion coefficient. We let it be 0.0000001. It is determined by calibrating
the quoting price to a reasonable range.
4.10 Simulation
The simulation is obtained through the following procedure.
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− δd(1− e−λd(T−t)) + γs2e(σ2−λd)(T−t)(ε+ 2q)
(4.85)




2. At time t + dt, the state variables are updated. Generate a random number ν with a
distribution F . With probability λs(δs)dt, the inventory variables decreases by ν and
the wealth increases by (s + δs)ν. With probability λb(δb)dt, the inventory variables
increases by ν and the wealth decreases by (s − δb)ν. The ture price is updated by
St(1 + α) where α is a normal distributed random number with mean 0 and variance
σdt.
3. Repeat step 2 until time T .
Figure (4.1) illustrates one simulation of a trading path. The first graph shows the bid
and ask quotes for one path of the bond price. The second graph shows the corresponding
accumulated inventory prosition. The third graph shows the profit of the dealer. The green
lines in all three graphs stand for the benchmark strategy. The red lines stand for the
inventory strategy.
Notice that, at time t = 25, the accumulated inventory is relatively high, but the bid and
ask quotes are not significantly low as we expect. This is because the dealer can trade his
inventory with the other dealers. The inventory quickly returns to zero by the time t = 26.
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Figure 4.1: Inventory strategy compare with benchmark strategy.
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We then run 1000 simulations to compare our inventory strategy to the symmetric strat-
egy, shown in figure (4.2). The red lines still stands for our inventory, and the green line is
for the symmetric strategy. First, the spread of our inventory strategy converges to that of
the symmetric strategy as the time approches the terminal time. Indeed, when we are close
to the terminal time, our inventory position is considered less risky, since the true price is
less likely to move drastically. Second, the average inventory position of symmetric strategy
is larger than that of our inventory strategy while the average profit of symmetric strategy
is lower than that of the inventory strategy. Though our inventory strategy has a narrower
spread than the symmetric strategy, it still has higher profit than the symmetric strategy
since our inventory strategy involves inter-dealer trading, and therefore has a higher volume
of trading than the symmetric strategy.
4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a continuous time trading model in the bond market with
inter-dealer trading. Due to the nonliearity of the HJB equation, the explicit solution is not
available even though the uniqueness and existence of the solution was approved. Therefore,
we introduced an approximate method to obtain the explicit solution. This approximate
solution has a better performance than the benchmark symmetric quoting strategy as fol-
lowing.
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1. The spread of this inter-dealer trading model is smaller than that of the benchmark
model.
2. The value function of this inter-dealer trading model is greater than that of the bench-
mark model.
The research in this chapter tells that the inter-dealer market is more liquid than the
market that without inter-dealer trading. For a dealer, the risk for holding an inventory is
reduced by trading with the other dealers.
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Figure 4.2: The Average of 1000 Simulations
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CHAPTER 5
DISCRETE TIME MODEL WITH INTER-DEALER TRADING
Since it is difficult to find the exact explicit solution in the continuous time model, we bulit
a dicrete time model to explore exact explicit solution without a sacrifice for complexity of
model settings. The only model setting that we have changed is that the dealer put the
quotes at a fixed time instead of a continuous time. We are able to find the exact explicit
solution under this discrete time model.
5.1 Model Settings
We will consider all the uncertainty on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,Ft,P).
The finite discrete time horizon. We consider a discrete time model with a trading
horizon of one day. We divide a day into n periods 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = T . At the
beginning of periods i (0 ≤ i ≤ n), the dealer sets bid and ask quotes (pbi , psi ).
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The market dynamics. We assume that the true price process is exougenous, which
is given by
dSt = σStdBt, where Bt is a Brownian Motion (5.1)
since here we use discrete time model, we will use the following approximation
∆Si = Si+1 − Si
= σSi(Bi+1 −Bi)
(5.2)
The dealer’s state variables and controls. The dynamics of the dealer’s cash and
inventory are described by the following eqautions:




i−1 − V bi pbi−1 + qdi pdi−1,
Ii = Ii−1 − V si + V bi − qdi
(5.3)





the buy orders and sell orders from customers at time ti. The dealer decides the amount q
d
i
to buy or sell to the interdealer market when he observes the interdealer price pdi . If p
d
i is
positive (negative), it means selling to (buying from) the dealer broker. In the other words,




i at time i.
The wealth of the dealer is
Wi = Ci + SiIi, where Si = Sti (5.4)
The change in wealth over period (ti, ti+1) will depend on (1) the arrival of transaction
and (2) return on security held in inventory. Therefore, we decompose the change in wealth
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into two components
∆Wi = Wi+1 −Wi
= ∆Ci + Si+1Ii+1 − SiIi
= ∆Ci + (Si+1 − Si)Ii+1 + Si(Ii+1 − Ii)
= ∆Ci + Si∆Ii + ∆SiIi+1
= V si+1p
s
i − V bi+1pbi + qdi pdi + Si∆Ii + ∆SiIi+1
= V si+1(Si + δ
s











































i is the change wealth due to transaction and ∆Xi = ∆SiIi+1 is
the change in the market value of the inventory. We denote δdi = p
d
i − Si.
The dealer quotes bid and ask prices around the true price,
psi = Si + δ
s
i
pbi = Si − δbi
(5.6)
Order dynamics. We simply assume that the order V si and V
b




i ) = λ
s(δsi ), V ari(V
s




i ) = λ
b(δbi ), V ari(V
b




The bid and ask quotes affect the arrival rates of orders. The further away from the ture
price the dealer positions his quote, the less often he will receive buy and sell orders. In the
other words, λs(δs) is a decreasing function of δs, and λb(δb) is a decreasing function of δb.
In the other way, it is equivalent to assume that
V si = λ
s(δsi ) + ε
s
i , V ari(ε
s
i ) = (σ
s∆t)2
V bi = λ
b(δbi ) + ε
b





where εsi and ε
s
i are the orders of uninformed customers, or noise customers. The rest of
incoming order flow, λs(δsi ) and λ
b(δbi ), is informed. These customers react to the price
change. Their demand is related to the spread.
The objective. The objective of the dealer is to maximize his profit from transaction
and minimize his risk from uncertainty in the security’s value. Therefore, we will use the
following objective function:
J(x, q, s,U0) = E(WT )− γV ar(Σnj=0∆Xj) (5.9)






j ) is the control at
time tj, Ui = (ui, ui+1, · · · , uT−1). The value function is defined by
v(x, q, s) = max
U0∈U [0,T−1]
J(x, q, s,U0) (5.10)
with U [0, T − 1] being a set of all admissible controls U0.
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5.2 Optimal quoting strategy for one period model
In the case of one period model, we only consider the trading period (ti, ti+1). The objective
function and value function can be written as
J(Ci, Ii, Si, ui) = Ei(Wi+1)− γV ari((Si+1 − Si)Ii+1)
v(Ci, Ii, Si) = max
ui






















i+1) = (Ii + (λ
b(δbi )− λs(δsi ))∆t)2 + ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2
V ari((Si+1 − Si)Ii+1) = σ2S2i ∆t((Ii + (λbi − λsi )∆t− qdi )2 + ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2)
(5.12)
Proof:
Ei(Wi+1) = Ei(Wi + ∆Wi)





























i+1) = Ei(Ii + ∆Ii)
2
= V ari(Ii + ∆Ii) + (Ei(Ii + ∆Ii))
2
= ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2 + (Ii + (λ
b
i − λsi )∆t− qdi )2
(5.14)
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Since Ei(∆SiIi+1) = 0, we have
V ari(∆SiIi+1) = Ei(∆SiIi+1)
2
= σ2S2i ∆t((Ii + (λ
b
i − λsi )∆t− qdi )2 + ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2)
(5.15)
From lemma 31,













− γσ2S2i ∆t((Ii + (λbi − λsi )∆t− qdi )2 + ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2)
(5.16)



















qdi = Ii + (λ
b




Proof: Based on the result of lemma 31, take the first order partial derivative of objective









2S2i ∆t(Ii + (λ
b








i − λsi )∆t− qdi )
qdi = Ii + (λ
b























q̂di = Ii + (λ
b










i ). The following theorem will give the conditions that
equations 5.17 exist solutions.
Theorem 33 For decreasing function λsi and λ
b













′′ < 2, equations 5.17 exist an unique solution.
Proof: We define g(x) = − f(x)
f ′(x)
+C. Since g′(x) = −1+ f(x)
(f ′(x))2
f ′′(x), if 0 < f(x)
(f ′(x))2
f ′′(x) < 2
on [0,M ] , then |g′(x)| < 1. By fixed point theorem, equation x = g(x) has an unique
solution. Applying λsi and λ
b
i as f(x), q
d
i and −qdi as C, we have the conlusion.








































qdi = Ii + (λ
b





Proof: We only need to prove that 5.17 is optimal. So, if ∂
2J
∂(ui)2






αs −B((λsi )′∆t)2 + δdi (λsi )′′∆t B(λsi )′(λbi)′(∆t)2 −B(λsi )′∆t
B(λsi )
′(λbi)
′(∆t)2 αb −B((λbi)′∆t)2 + δdi (λsi )′′∆t B(λbi)′∆t












−B(λsi )′∆t B(λbi)′∆t −B

(5.21)
where αs = (δsi (λ
s
i )
′′ + 2(λsi )




′)∆t and B = 2aσ2S2i ∆t.























































=(δbi − δdi )(λbi)′′∆t+ 2(λbi)′)∆t
























and obviously −B ≤ 0. Therefore, ∂2J
∂(ui)2
is negative definite at ûi. Function J attain its
maximum at ûi.
Example 35 Let λsi = A1e
−k1δs, λbi = A1e
−k1δb, A1, A2, k1, k2 are positive. For δ
d













qdi = Ii + (λ
b




Remark 36 1. Theorem 34 shows that the quoted bid/ask price is not directly related to
dealer’s inventory, but positively correlated to the price of inter-dealer. The bid/ask
price to customers and the price of inter-dealer co-move up and dowm together, which
is consistent with the finding from the empirical data analysis.
2. The spread δsi + δ
b
i is not related to the inter-dealer price.
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3. The value function is


















+ ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2)











In the case of multi-period model, we will consider the trading period (ti, tT ) 0 ≤ i ≤ T .







i ≤ j ≤ T − 1. Each decision (δsj , δbj , qdj ) only depends on the current state (Ci, Ii, Si). We
call Ui = (ui, ui+1, · · · , uT−1) policy. We denote the optimal policy Ûi = (ûi, ûi+1, · · · , ûT−1)
We notice that










Ji(Ci, Ii, Si, ui) = Ei(WT )− γV ari(Σnj=i∆Xj)





We denote the second term of equation 5.28Gi(Ci, Ii, Si, ui) = Σ
n
j=i(Ei(∆Wj−a(∆Xj)2)).
Obviously, Ji(Ci, Ii, Si, ui) = Wi + G(Ci, Ii, Si, ui). Since Wi is not a function of ui, it is
equavalent to maximize Gi(Ci, Ii, Si,Ui). We simply denote
Vi(Ci, Ii, Si) = max
Ui
Gi(Ci, Ii, Si,Ui) (5.29)
We summarize the multi-period model as following.
max
Ui
Gi(Ci, Ii, Si,Ui) = Σnj=i(Ei(∆Wj − a(∆Xj)2))
where Ui is the control or policy














∆Xj = (Sj+1 − Sj)(Ij − V sj+1 + V bj+1 − qdj )
(5.30)
Theorem 37 Bellman’s Principle
For multi-period model 5.30, the Bellman’s equation of dynamic programming is
Vi(Ci, Ii, Si) = max
ui
{δsiλsi + δbiλbi)∆t+ qdi δdi
− aσ2S2i ∆t((Ii + (λbi − λsi )∆t− qdi )2 + ((σs)2 + (σb)2)(∆t)2)
+ Ei(Vi+1(Ci, Ii, Si))}
(5.31)

















j 1 ≤ j < n.
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Theorem 38 The optimal policy for multi-period model
For any 1 < k < n− 1, if δdi is a martingale on (Ω,F,Ft,P) and λsi satisfies conditions 5.32,



























qdi =Ii + (λ
b
i − λsi )∆t
(5.35)
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k − λsk)∆t− qdk)− (n− k − 1)Ekδk+1
q̂dk = Ii + (λ
b
i − λsi )∆t.
(5.36)













q̂dk = Ii + (λ
b
i − λsi )∆t.
(5.37)
Under the conditions 5.32, 5.33, ∂
2Gk
∂(uk)2





αs −B((λsk)′∆t)2 + δdi (λsk)′′∆t B(λsk)′(λbk)′(∆t)2 −B(λsk)′∆t
B(λsk)
′(λbk)
























′)∆t and B = 2aσ2S2k∆t.
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and αs + δdi (λ
s
i )
′′∆t < 0,αb + δdk(λ
s
k)
′′∆t < 0, then 5.37 is the optimal solution.





















The second equality holds because Ŷj is a function of δ
d







j − λ̂sj)∆t− q̂k)
=0
(5.40)
then we have that for any j ≥ k + 1, Ek−1q̂j = 0. Therefore, the third equality holds.











Under the induction rule, 5.37 is the optimal solution.
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5.4 Conclusion
The result of this trading model shows that
1. The dealer’s bid and ask price is positive correlated to inter-dealer’s price, which ex-
plains the finding from the data.
2. Dealer trades his whole imbalance with dealer broke or the other dealer, therefore,
the price movement is not directly related to inventory movement. The price is only
related to inter-dealer’s price and current order flow rate. That is why data shows
weak relation between trading drift and price.
3. The quoted price only reveal the cost of liquidity, not reflect the other risks such as
interest rate risk and default risk. As we mention in chapter 1, dealer trade for liquidity
and make profit from providing liquidity, not betting on the movement of the fair price
of the bond.
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θ0(s, T ) = 0
(.42)
Let
τ = T − t, z = lns− 1
2
σ2τ (.43)







(2− 2γkεe2ze(2σ2−λd)τ + λd
4γ
e−2ze−(2σ
2+λd)τ ) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
v(q, z, τ) = 0
(.44)
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APPENDIX B BOND VALUATION
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Bond valuation is to determine the fair price of a bond. The theoretical fair value of a
bond is the present value of the stream of cash flows it is expected to generate. Hence, the
value of a bond is obtained by discounting the bond’s expected cash flows to the present
using the appropriate discount rate. The discount rates in different maturity time are not
linear or log linear related, but in practice refered as term structure. How to determine the
term structure is usually what people say about meauring interest rate risk.
The term structure encapsulates the market’s views of the future behaviour of short-term
interest rates. The arrival of information leads to a revision of expectations and thus moves
the yield curve. Therefore, in section 1, we derive the term structure given the spot rate of
short term interest rate.
The price is not independent with the market, as bond price is contingent on interest
rate. Treasury bond prices usually service as a benchmark for pricing financial products.
HJM method extend this idea to use forward rate as a reference for pricing. Even though it
is not perfect, it offers us a novel insight into pricing. In section 2, we give a short review of
HJM method.
The parameters in single factor model change over time, which mean that it can not
catch the pattern of interest-rate volatilites across maturities. Then comes the multifactor
models, it shows that the parameters are persistent over time. In section 3, we introduce
the idea of multifactor model by a simple case, two factor model.
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In regard to default risk, in section 4, we start our analysis from a simple formular with
known default risk, which is available from credit rating company. My curiosity is how the
bond price of AAA company related to that of BBB company with various maturity.
.1 Interest Rate Models and Bond Pricing
In this section, we will briefly review interest rate models, under which we will price bonds
without default risk. (See details in notes by Robert V. Kohn)
Basic terminology
Short rate at time t, or instantaneous interest rate, is denoted by r(t).
A zero-coupon bond, maturing at time T, pays 1 at time T . Its price at time t, B(t, T ), is
given by




The instantaneous forward rate f(t, T ) is defined by
f(t, T ) = −∂logB(t, T )
∂T
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This is the instantaneous interest rate, agreed upon at time t, for money borrowed at time









=− logB(t, T ),
(.46)
so




You can agree at time t to recieve interest rate f(t, u) at each time u ∈ [t, T ]. If you invest





f(t, u)du} = 1
at time T .
Interest Rate Models
1. Vasicek(1977). The short rate solves
dr(t) = (θ − ar(t))dt+ σdw(t) (.47)
with θ, a, and σ constant and a > 0. The advantage of such a model is that it leads
to explicit formulas. Moreover, P (t, T ) has lognormal statistics. The disadvantage of
such a model is that it has just a few paramters. So there is no hope of calibrating
it to match the entire yield curve P (0, T ) observed in the marketplace at time 0. For
this reason Vasicek and its siblings are rarely used in practice.
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2. Hull-White model. It extended Vasicek model, depending on a function of one variable.
dr(t) = (θ(t)− ar(t))dt+ σdw(t) (.48)
where a and σ are still constant but θ is a function of t.
3. Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) Model.
dr(t) = (θ − ar(t)dt+ σ
√
r(t)dw(t) (.49)
4. Factor Model (Duffie & Kan 1996).
The method to derive bond price contingent on the dynamic of interest rate is:
1. Assume B(t, T ) of affine form
B(r, t, T ) = A(t, T )e−rC(t,T )
2. Noticing that e−
∫ T
t r(u)duB(t, T ) is a martingale, find de−
∫ T
t r(u)duB(t, T ) and set the
dt term zero. Then we have a partial differential equation satisfying the terminal
condition B(r, T, T ) = 1.
3. Solving the partial differential equation, we obtain the formula of B(r, t, T )
Fortunately, under those three interest rate models, they all have closed form solution
for B(t, T ). We list all the solutions for reference.
Bond Price under Vasicek model
Under Vasicek model, the bond price at time t is given by
B(t, T ) = A(t, T )e−C(t,T )r(t) (.50)
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(C(t, T )− T + t)− σ2
4a
(C2(t, T ))] , C(t.T ) = 1
a
(1− ea(T−t))
Bond Price under Hull-White Model Under Hull-White model, the bond price at
time t is given by
B(t, T ) = A(t, T )e−C(t,T )r(t) (.51)
where A(t, T ) = exp[−
∫ T
t
θ(s)C(s, T )ds − σ2
2a2
(C(t, T ) − T + t) − σ2
4a
(C2(t, T ))] , C(t.T ) =
1
a
(1 − ea(T−t)) We can determine θ from the term structure at time 0 to calibrate the yield
curve observed from marketplace at time 0.
Bond Price under CIR Model Under CIR model, the bond price at time t is given
by
B(t, T ) = A(t, T )e−C(t,T )r(t) (.52)
where
A(t, T ) =(
2γe(α+γ)(T−t/2)
(α + γ)(eγ(T−t) − 1) + 2γ
)2θ/σ
2
C(t, T ) =
2(eγ(T−t) − 1)






Rather than work in terms of a short rate, it specifies the evolution of the instantaneous
forward rate f(t, T ) by solving an SDE in t:
df(t, T ) = α(t, T )dt+ σ(t, T )dW (t)
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The Bond prices





dB(t, T )/K(t) = (B(t, T )/K(t))((1/2σ2(t, T )−
∫ T
t
α(t, u)du)dt+ σ(t, T )dW (t))
To implement HJM, you specify a function σ(t, T ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
.3 Default Risk and Bond Pricing
Since Merton (1974) to Longstaff (1995), the value of a particular issue of corporate debt is
obtained through contingent-claims-based approach. In this approach, the corporate debt is
contingent on if the total dynamic value of the assets of the firm falls below a given threshold
value K for the firm at which financial distress occurs. Longstaff (1995) developed a simple
framework for pricing risky corporate bond that incorporated both default risk and interest-
rate risk. Applying the model, it derived a closed form expressions for fixed-rate and floating
rate debt. However, the dynamic of the total asset value of the firm is described only by
two constant parameters. It is too rough for the default risk. In addition, estimating those
parameters is difficult in practice. The demand for more realistic valuation of default bonds
leads to the development of an alternative, reduced form approach(Jarrow and Turnbull
1995; Duffie and Singleton 1999). The reduced form approach does not look at the structure
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of firm’s liabilities, but the default probability.
Credit rating companies, such as Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poors, are professional
in measuring default risk. Investors, issuers, investment banks, broker-dealers, and govern-
ments rely on their rating as reference.
In this section, we derive the bond price by using the default probability provided by the
rating company.
Let Bd(t, T ) denote the price of a default risky discount bond at time t with maturity
date T, B(t, T ) denote the price of a default free bond at time t with maturity date T.
Assumption 1 1: Let r denote the short-term riskless interest rate process. The dynamics
of r are given by
dr(t) = u(r(t), t)dt+ σ(r(t), t)dwt (.54)
Assumption 2 2: The payoff function is expressed as
1− wIγ<T
where I is an indicator function that takes value one if the firm defaults during the life of the
bond, and zero otherwise, w is writedown rate, and γ, a random variable, denotes the default
time. We assume that defaulting is an independent event with interest rate r(t). The default
risk α(t, T ) = Et(Iγ<T ) is a increasing function of maturity T , given by Moody’s rating.
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From the assumption 1 and 2, we are at the position to derive the formula of Bd(t, T ).
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